50 Years on from Martin v Martin 1976 – Are Add-backs Fit for Purpose?

Fifty years ago, on 14 June 1976, the concept of add-backs in financial remedy cases was first articulated. In the ground-breaking case of Martin v Martin [1976] Fam 335, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Purchas J notionally to add back the monies spent by the husband, following separation, on his unsuccessful business ventures, in its determination of a fair division of assets. In what subsequently has become a well-known passage, Cairns LJ stated, that ‘a spouse cannot be allowed to fritter away the assets by extravagant living or reckless speculation and then to claim as great a share of what is left as he would have been entitled to if he had behaved reasonably’.

Add-backs, of course, do not create more money. But they are a mechanism that can mean that the over-spender reaps what they sow. The husband’s conduct in Martin was such that it made it ‘just for the court to be more concerned to mitigate the reduction in the wife’s standard of living than the husband’s’. The focus was on minimising the impact on the party who had not wasted money, rather than punishing the party who had. Importantly, the Court of Appeal clearly distinguished between personal misconduct and overspending of assets. Cairns LJ noted that ‘In my opinion, nothing that was said in Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] Fam 72 was intended to apply to any conduct either during or after cohabitation which has the effect of reducing the funds available to provide for the needs of both after divorce’. It was in Wachtel at first instance that Ormrod J (as endorsed by the Court of Appeal) stated that conduct would only affect outcome if it was ‘obvious and gross’. So, in Martin, there appeared to have been a clear distinction between ‘gross and obvious’ conduct, for which we say read personal misconduct, and overspending: the former was considered an assessment of personal behaviour, the latter a question of fair allocation of assets.[[1]]

Martin predated the introduction of s 25(2)(g) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973,[[2]] which specifically provides that the court shall have regard to the conduct of each of the parties if that conduct is such that it would be inequitable to disregard it. But, over time, the ‘Martin distinction’ between add-backs and personal conduct has been eroded and ultimately lost completely. It was more than 30 years after Martin that add-backs specifically started to be identified as species of conduct, see Moylan J in Evans v Evans [2013] EWHC 506 (Fam) and Moor J in MAP v MFP [2015] EWHC 627 (Fam) where he said ‘It does seem to me that arguments in this area essentially come down to an issue of conduct as defined in section 25(2)(g) namely “conduct that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard”’.

This categorisation has since been applied by other High Court Judges, leading ultimately to Mostyn J in OG v AG [2020] EWFC 52 categorising conduct into four different species: personal misconduct, add-backs, litigation misconduct and drawing inferences about undisclosed assets. These four are very different scenarios but, it appears, are considered together for litigation purposes. In Tsvetkov v Khayrova [2023] EWFC 130, Peel J set out the procedure for pleading conduct generally and stated, without differentiating between the species, that pleaded conduct must, per [43(ii)], ‘meet the conduct threshold, which has consistently been set at a high or exceptional level’ although the test for each species of conduct differs.

The elision of add-backs with conduct has, we say, made the test for the former formidably, and unduly, high. The result is that add-backs have lost their flexibility and simple logic and have become disproportionately expensive and difficult to litigate.

Family law was very different in 1976. It would be nearly 25 years until White v White [2000] UKHL 54 revolutionised the approach of the courts to financial cases, removing gender bias, and introducing for the first time the yardstick of equality in dividing matrimonial assets. It took a further 6 years for the principles of needs, sharing and compensation to be developed in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24.

But despite the clear benefit and fairness of these developments, the authors contend that the rationale behind the decision in Martin produced fairer outcomes than the current approach to add-backs. Add-backs were a useful mechanism to prevent one party’s unilateral dissipation of assets which unfairly prejudiced the non-dissipating spouse’s share. They were borne of pragmatism, easy to calculate and, we believe, consistent with concepts of fairness in the general population. We suggest something has gone wrong when the outcomes that the litigation generate deviate too far from what the average person considers fair.

What is the legal test?

What is the legal test to add back a sum? The jurisprudence uses words such as ‘reckless’, ‘wanton’ and ‘wilful’, without any clear explanation of what they are intended to mean. Are they the same test expressed differently, or different tests?

The law has evolved. In Norris v Norris [2002] EWHC 2996 (Fam), the husband had financed over-spending, i.e. expenditure over income, of £350,000 in 2 years, including spending on items like jewellery for his new partner, from the parties’ capital. Bennett J found his overspend was ‘reckless’ and as a consequence added £250,000 back. Given that the parties had more than enough to meet their needs – £4m each – he could have chosen to add back the entirety but ‘did not think it appropriate’. He posed the unanswerable question: ‘Why should the wife be disadvantaged in the split of assets by the husband’s reckless expenditure?’ and held that an overspend that ‘recklessly depleted’ assets and thus ‘potentially’ disadvantaged the other should be added back.

Five years later, in Vaughan v Vaughan [2007] EWCA Civ 1085, the Court of the Appeal per Wilson LJ (as he then was) reformulated the test from Martin v Martin, from ‘reckless’ to ‘clear evidence of dissipation (in which there is a wanton element)’. The Court of Appeal warned that a notional re-attribution has to be conducted ‘very cautiously’ and ‘that the fiction does not extend to treatment of the sums reattributed to a spouse as cash which he can deploy in meeting his needs, for example in the purchase of accommodation’.

‘Wanton’ has a multiplicity of meanings from licentious to extravagant, but all import an unjustifiable and deliberate action, deserving of criticism.

In McCartney v Mills McCartney [2008] EWHC 401 (Fam), Bennett J found that £500,000 of the wife’s expenditure was ‘unreasonable’: he was critical of the wife’s unreasonable belief that she was entitled to the marital standard of living indefinitely. He referred to his own test in Norris of ‘reckless’, and to Vaughan, but did not actually categorise the spend as any more than ‘unreasonable’. Moreover, he did not specifically include the overspend as a head of conduct, and, indeed, went on to consider conduct – personal conduct – explicitly later in the judgment. We comment that the wife’s spending could not properly be classified as reckless, given it was found to be a deliberate attempt to preserve a level of marital expenditure with the aim of increasing the claim.

Thereafter, add-backs started to be classified as a species of conduct by the High Court, for example by Moylan J (as he then was) in Evans v Evans [2013] EWHC 506 (Fam) and, as noted above, by Moor J in MAP v MPF [2015] EWHC 627 (Fam). Moor J went on to limit the scope of add-backs through several methods. First, he noted that there had to be ‘wanton dissipation of assets’ a rather higher test than that in Vaughan of ‘dissipation in which there is a wanton element’. Though he quoted Vaughan later in the judgment, it is ‘wanton dissipation’ which has become the key definition in this area. Second, Moor J emphasised the importance of motivation: he highlighted that deliberate spending to deprive the other party could not be allowed. And lastly, and now infamously, he found that a spend of £250,000 on drugs and cocaine would not be added back as the husband’s personality flaws meant he could not help himself. The husband’s personality had helped to generate capital and then waste it. There was no add-back, however, as the judge held, essentially, that you have to take your spouse as you find them.

In BD v FD (No 2) (Application of the Principle of Need) [2016] EWHC 594 (Fam), Moylan J (as he then was) reiterated the high tests for add-back, holding that it was a species of conduct. But he found the wife’s spending sufficiently ‘exorbitant’ to justify an add-back. An overspending husband escaped add-back again in AP v ALP v Krechet Holdings Ltd v Ardea Ltd [2018] EWHC 2758 (Fam), where Moor J, arguably eliding deliberate and wanton, used the phrase ‘wilful dissipation’ as the test. He doubled down on holding that overspend – here of ‘mouth-watering’ sums – should be subject to the Miller; McFarlane restriction (derived from Wachtel) that the spend therefore had to be ‘gross and obvious’. Effectively, a volte-face on the dicta in Martin, the genesis of this area of jurisprudence.

Recent authorities have led to a lack of clarity. In OG v AG, Mostyn J cites the jurisprudence as ‘where one party has wantonly and recklessly dissipated assets’ which implies both elements are required. That analysis is quoted and impliedly endorsed by Peel J in Tsvetkov. In BS v HC [2026] EWFC 20 (B),[[3]] HHJ Hess considered the spending must be wanton or reckless for an add-back. The judge went on to accept Moor J’s focus on the spender’s intention. He held that the test for add-backs was a high one ‘only dissipations which are wanton or reckless and where the spending was deliberately targeted towards diminishing the share of the party will justify such an add-back’. He went on to state ‘It is right for the court to state clearly that any financial remedies litigant who does engage in manipulative spending between separation and a financial remedies hearing with a view to diminishing the sharing claim of the other does run the risk that the court will add back that the amounts spent to restore mathematical fairness’.

That view was arguably in contrast to the view of Nicholas Allen KC (sitting as a deputy High Court Judge), in the previous year , in BY v GC (No 2) [2025] EWFC 397, who did not consider the spender’s motivation to be a necessary element of the add-back. He derived four propositions from Evans v Evans:

(1) an ‘add-back’ argument requires an analysis of what both parties have been spending. It is not sufficient to simply point out certain aspects of one party’s expenditure; the overall picture needs to be analysed. Context is important;

(2) Vaughan was cited with approval – ‘a notional reattribution has to be conducted very cautiously, by reference only to clear evidence of dissipation (in which there is a wanton element) …’;

(3) reattribution must be justified in the context of the case. It is a form of conduct and, as such, it must be ‘inequitable to disregard’; and

(4) there are therefore two elements: (a) a factual/evidential element – Is there clear evidence of wanton dissipation?; and (b) a legal/discretionary element – Would it be inequitable to disregard it or is notional reattribution required in order to achieve an outcome which is fair?

What is clear on any analysis, however, is that the test to add back is higher now than originally intended. Since the case of MAP v MPF [2015] EWHC 627 (Fam), the overarching theme has become one of a focus on the intention behind the overspend and the culpability of the spender, rather than to focus on the erosion of the marital acquest and the impact on the financial outcome for the other spouse.

Doing the best we can, we suggest the test (in respect of spending other than on legal costs) appears to be the following: the dissipation must be wanton or reckless, with the effect of diminishing the other party’s award, so as to cross the threshold of inequitable to disregard, with some but not all of the judiciary considering a deliberate intention to deprive the other to be a necessary element. This high test means that the over-spender, rather the non-culpable party, has the advantage in litigation. Keen readers may also note that overspending wives seem to have done rather worse than high-flying or drug-addicted husbands.

Adding back legal costs

In contrast, when it comes to legal costs, the jurisprudence has largely developed in the opposite direction with the legal test lowered rather than elevated.

A brief traverse of the case law illustrates the increasing willingness of the courts to add back sums spent on legal fees from a restrictive start. In MacGreagh v MacGreagh [1995] 2 FCR 321, Thorpe J (as he then was) acknowledged that misconduct in proceedings is usually reflected in costs, but the ‘husband’s strategy had been so gross and so extreme that it would be inequitable to disregard it’ so it had sounded in the award by quantifying the wife’s share as if the waste and destruction had not happened. The husband’s behaviour in that case had crossed the conduct threshold, which was not a necessary element of add-backs at the time as set out above.

However, that case was something of an exception: judges were generally cautious about adding back sums that had been spent on costs. Coleridge J in R v R [2011] EWHC 3093 (Fam) insightfully noted at the time that ‘a wife often has higher costs because she has to make the running, and particularly where, as here, there was deep, and to some extent justified, suspicion’.[[4]] He went on to discourage the use of add-backs when it came to costs. King J (as she then was) went on to quote R v R in GS v L (Financial Remedies: Pre-acquired Assets: Needs) [2011] EWHC 1759 (Fam).

Since then the direction of travel has seen judges being more critical of overspending on costs, especially since the change to FPR PD 28A in 2019.[[5]] In TT v CDS (Rev 1) [2020] EWCA Civ 1215, Moylan LJ confirmed in the Court of Appeal, ‘The general approach is that litigation conduct within the financial remedy proceedings will be reflected, if appropriate, in a costs order. However, there are cases in which the court has determined that one party’s litigation conduct has been such that it should be taken into account when the court is determining its award’.[[6]] The judge clarified that the caution about notional reattribution in Vaughan does not mean ‘that the financial effect of litigation conduct cannot impact on a needs-based award’. Indeed, his obiter view was that the ‘financial consequences of the litigation misconduct, perhaps combined with other factors, might be such that it is fair that the innocent party is awarded all the matrimonial assets’.

Add-backs for legal costs are now routinely pursued when there is a difference in the parties’ expenditure. HHJ Hess analysed the authorities on adding back legal costs in YC v ZC [2022] EWFC 137 (B).[[7]] The judge concluded where one party has spent ‘at a sensible and moderate level and the other has incurred legal costs at a grossly disproportionate level’:

‘absent any proper explanation for the differential in spending, the court can deal with any unfairness arising from the differential in legal costs spending by making an adjustment in the court’s asset schedule before distribution, for example by excluding a portion of the over-spender’s unpaid costs and/or adding back a portion of the over-spender’s costs already paid, thus appropriately penalising the over-spender without actually making an inter partes order for costs.’

At that point, add-backs for legal costs appeared not to be subject to a test of exceptionality, nor the requirement that the expenditure has to have been wanton or reckless. However, Peel J may have been requiring a higher test in HO v TL [2023] EWFC 215 when he said, ‘Although I accept that this add-back technique is available, in my judgment it is best deployed where it leaps from the page’. That, at least, sounds like the hurdle that must be crossed for establishing excessive legal expenditure is closer to that of add-backs generally.

As with other forms of conduct, the jurisprudence is driven by policy. The test for add-backs of other forms of expenditure is high so as to discourage ‘disproportionate forensic accounting disputes’,[[8]] whereas it is low in respect of legal costs to ensure that the ‘grossly disproportionate spender (and the solicitors representing such a person)’ feel there is a check on legal costs spending.[[9]] The difficulty, however, with a seemingly different test for add-backs of general spending, and add-backs for legal costs, is that it implies that it is worse to over-spend on legal fees (often, this is the financially weaker party seeking disclosure) than to spend monies on rather more insalubrious activities.

Are add-backs fit for purpose?

We suggest the problems with the current law on add-backs can be distilled as follows:

(1) an excessively high, and inconsistent threshold, in part, to the elision of add-backs with conduct;

(2) a focus on the motivations, and culpability, of the over-spender (save in respect of spending on legal costs) rather than the impact on the other party;

(3) the limited attention that is paid to the fact that over-spending ultimately erodes the marital acquest; creating a tension between the care placed on quantification of the marital acquest, and an indifferent approach to its erosion; and most importantly

(4) a difference between the approach of the courts and the view of the ordinary person’s sense of standards of fairness.

We deal briefly with each in turn without wishing to repeat comments raised earlier.

The elision of add-backs with conduct means that the test for add-backs is high, usually prohibitively high, and the procedural obligations are burdensome. The argument must be pleaded with full particularity and evidenced in the Form E – at a time when it is difficult to do so as no financial disclosure has been provided. In our experience, some, although not all, judges now require that the non-miscreant set out how the overspend affects their claim and possible award. That all takes time and money in circumstances where it may, frankly, be self-evident from the bank statements. Courts require arguments to be proportionate, for which we understand that the overspend must be substantial, potentially ignoring the fact that relatively small amounts can have a far bigger impact on the long-term outcome of lower asset cases. The legal and evidential hurdles make running the argument successfully extremely difficult, the financially weaker party having to take all the risk, or bear the cost of the expenditure. The other party – the possible over-spender – will provide another disincentive when they almost inevitably threaten that they will seek an issue-based costs order if the argument does not succeed.

The court will consider that it is obliged to consider the motivations of the spender. It may also feel obligated to discern whether or not there is anything inherent in that party that somehow excuses their behaviour or justifies forgiving their overspending on the basis that they have some other balancing good quality – most likely significant entrepreneurial flair that has generated (most of) the matrimonial assets. This investigation into these issues takes the court into an unwelcome, and unnecessary, analysis of personality.

We say the focus should, instead, remain on impact and outcome. The original purpose of add-backs was to limit or alleviate the disadvantage suffered by the non-spender. The impact of overspending is the same, irrespective of whether or not the spender was manipulative and reckless, or indifferent and selfish.

Financial remedy litigation focuses on two elements: computation and distribution. The concept of the marital acquest establishes that the court considers matrimonial assets belong to both parties, not just the party in control of the assets. Overspending by one party of the marital acquest is not just spending their money, it is also the involuntary expenditure of the other party’s money too; an invasion of their resources. The unknowing, and non-consenting, party is therefore paying 50% of the costs of their estranged spouse’s holiday with their new partner, or new Porsche, or drug habit. The jurisprudence gives the impression the court will probably, save in the most extreme circumstances, be indifferent to that spend. A lot of court time is spent on quantifying the marital acquest with precision for equal division, with significant attention now being paid to excluding post-separation accrual – a notoriously difficult area. This is in contrast to the relative lack of attention given to arguments about what the pot fairly should have been, were it not for expenditure during the decline of the marriage and post-separation. It is a cruel irony for the non-miscreant to have a judge determine that their add-back claim does not cross the conduct threshold and shall not be heard, but then hear the judge analyse post-separation accrual in detail.

Add-backs are routinely refused because of the need to prove the spender’s deliberate manipulation or because of ‘proportionality’. That approach, we say, is inconsistent with how the general public would perceive that a fair outcome should be achieved. In non-court dispute resolution (NCDR) and negotiation, we have all seen parties agree to add back some, or all, of the overspending, which must be a recognition by both parties of the fairness of doing so.

It does not have to be this way. There is currently heated debate as to whether or not financial remedies courts should reflect personal misconduct and, in particular, findings (or admissions) of coercive control or other instances of domestic abuse, in the outcome of cases. The principled reason against making an award that reflects personal misconduct is that it is difficult to identify the financial consequences, or that those consequences are not quantifiable (or at least not in the foreseeable future). Wherever one falls in that debate, add-backs do not have those problems. They have financial consequences and are financially quantifiable, so they should fit easily in the current framework.

What can practitioners do in the current framework?

We do not have a silver bullet for the advantage given to the spender by the current case law. Until there is a brave litigant willing to take this issue to the Court of Appeal, practitioners may consider the following:

(1) if the spending is ongoing:

(a) regrettably, spending too much time in mediation/pre-proceedings NCDR will only benefit the spender. If the court is not going to add back the expenditure, getting to the end of the litigation is the only way to stop the spending; and

(b) try to negotiate each party being allocated the same amount of funds in the interim on the basis that the sums are distributed on account of final awards.

(2) plead the add-back on the Form E, in the ES1 and reflect it on the ES2. Consider whether it should be raised in 4.1.2 Significant changes in assets or income likely to occur during the NEXT 12 months, as well as the conduct box;

(3) make clear in recitals (if permitted by the judge) and/or correspondence what spending is not accepted to lay the groundwork for the add-back claim; and

(4) it is impossible to plead and prove an add-back argument without disclosure to evidence it. That means persuading the judge at the first hearing to go back further than the most recent 12 months of bank statements. In our experience, it is rare to find a client who says that the prospect of separating has only occurred in the last 12 months; marriages (and civil partnerships) usually break down over a longer period. The argument that greater disclosure should not be allowed because it will increase costs no longer holds true in the digital age as solicitors turn to AI tools which can analyse large data sets swiftly. If a party is moving and spending money, directions may need to be sought for direct credit card statements, business bank/credit accounts, directors loan accounts and management accounts where appropriate.

What is the solution?

At the time of writing, the government has said it is about to undertake a consultation on making outcomes in financial remedy cases fairer. When you respond to that, we invite you to consider this issue because, at its worst, what is referred to as ‘overspending’ in the jurisprudence, crosses the test of, and should be seen as, economic abuse.[[10]] We suggest that resolving how to deal with unilateral overspending of the parties’ resources would give litigants greater confidence that the court is engaged in stopping or rectifying abuse.

There are a few options you may consider raising in the consultation. Prevention is always better than cure and, like many areas (legal services payment orders, rehousing), the ability of the court to make interim orders, particularly interim lump sum orders, would be enormously beneficial. There seem to be few if any arguments against the court being given the powers to make an interim lump sum order (and an interim order for sale). Sharing assets that are agreed to be part of the marital acquest at the first appointment on the basis of overall claims would give the parties transparency on spending, freedom to spend on legal fees and some protection from the profligacy of the other. A reformed scheme could also permit the court to make targeted interim orders, to transfer property, shares or funds into joint names, trust or escrow, or the applicant’s sole name (subject to safeguards (if considered appropriate) and later adjustment). Crucially, these powers would be protective rather than distributive, to protect against historical misappropriations and prevent future dissipations.

Alternatively, consideration could be given to some form of saisie conservatoire, as in other jurisdictions. In ND v KP [2011] EWHC 457 (Fam) and UL v BK [2013] EWHC 1735 (Fam), Mostyn J was at pains to emphasise we do not have a system where assets are automatically frozen pending the disposal of a divorce or any other kind of claim. That approach is not universal. In New York, for example, from the date of proceedings assets are no longer shared and statutory preservation orders automatically come into force on the filing of divorce proceedings and service of the relevant order (s 236 Domestic Relations Law). Absent agreement by the parties, these orders restrain both parties from disposing of, encumbering or transferring assets, other than in the ordinary course of practice in line with how the family had otherwise been conducting their finances and to pay legal and professional fees. A breach of the provisions may be enforced by contempt. The court must also consider whether overspend amounts to ‘the wasteful dissipation of assets by each party’. Therefore, expenditure on affairs, addictions, gambling or similar unilateral purposes that do not create or bring value to the marital estate (but have instead denuded the marital estate of value) can be rectified by being added back, supported by disclosure obligations to require the delivery of necessary evidence.

A final option would be for policymakers to step in to ensure add-backs are a realistic remedy, by changing the presumption in favour of adding back and ensuring the financially vulnerable party does not have to face contested disclosure applications to evaluate and run their case. The writers contend that there is an inconsistency between the test in s 37(5) MCA 1973, where there is a rebuttable presumption that any disposition in the 3 years before the application was done to defeat the other person’s claim, and the difficulty in persuading judges to order more than 12 months of personal statements. That is not to say every case should be weighed down with 3 years’ disclosure, but where there is a concern about dissipation, having a judge on a busy list summarily decide 2 years of disclosure is ‘proportionate’ can advantage the spender. One way for the court to better case manage additional disclosure requirements would be for section 4.1.1 of Form E to be expanded to require each party to provide a schedule of assets which have been transferred to third parties, or which created a significant change in assets covering a minimum of a 3-year period prior to Form E. The fact that such a requirement is required would support the principle that overspending will be assessed and could alleviate all the expensive disputes about disclosure.

Conclusion

We want to make clear that we do not underestimate the difficulty of managing these issues during litigation. Nor are we arguing that spouses should have the same level of spending; there may be good reasons why one party has to spend more than the other, on legal fees or in other aspects of their life. However, if the law is there to encourage ‘good behaviour’ and stop abuse then it currently fails. The party who overspends, other than on legal costs, is unlikely to face any penalty.

We say bring back the ‘Martin distinction’ between add-back and conduct, reformulating add-backs to be merely part of the computation exercise. Cairns LJ identified them as a means to ensure a ‘just’ outcome. We agree and say the current approach is not fit for purpose.

[[1]]: See also Scallon v Scallon [1990] 1 FLR 194 where the Court of Appeal (including by then Purchas LJ) drew a distinction between spending, albeit after breakdown of the marriage, and conduct.

[[2]]: Through the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984.

[[3]]: Not citable

[[4]]: Note, the point that the party who has to make the running is likely to have to spend greater sums to achieve a fair outcome is still valid. Moylan J made a similar point in MF v SF [2015] EWHC 1273 (Fam): ‘it is not unusual for the effective applicant, in this case the Wife, to incur costs which are greater than those of the respondent’.

[[5]]: FPR PD 28A, para 4.4: ‘The court will take a broad view of conduct for the purposes of this rule and will generally conclude that to refuse openly to negotiate reasonably and responsibly will amount to conduct in respect of which the court will consider making an order for costs. This includes in a “needs” case where the applicant litigates unreasonably resulting in the costs incurred by each party becoming disproportionate to the award made by the court. Where an order for costs is made at an interim stage the court will not usually allow any resulting liability to be reckoned as a debt in the computation of the assets’.

[[6]]: TT v CDS (Rev 1) [2020] EWCA Civ 1215.

[[7]]: RH v RH [2007] EWHC 396 (Fam), LS v JS [2012] EWHC 2960 (Fam), A v M [2021] EWFC 89 and Azarmi-Movafagh v Bassiri-Dezfouli [2021] EWCA Civ 1184.

[[8]]: BD v FD (No 2) (Application of the Principle of Need) [2016] EWHC 594 (Fam).

[[9]]: YC v ZC [2022] EWFC 137 (B).

[[10]]: ‘any behaviour that has a substantial adverse effect on B’s ability to— (a) acquire, use or maintain money or other property, or (b) obtain goods or services’: Domestic Abuse Act 2021, s 1(4).

This is an article from the forthcoming Financial Remedies Journal 2026 Issue 2.