Labeja v The Estate of Shatochina Raisa Labeja & Anor [2026] EWFC 53 (B)

Judgment date: 24 February 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/b/2026/53

HHJ Farquhar. Application by H to set aside Decree Absolute made in 2014 on the basis of fraud and/or procedural irregularity.

Background

The case concerned an application by H to set aside Decree Absolute pronounced in November 2014 on the grounds that it had been obtained through fraud and/or procedural irregularity. W died in March 2022. Her son from a previous marriage was joined to the case as Second Respondent (‘R2’). R2 was the personal representative of W’s estate.

H was originally from Uganda. W was from Bulgaria. They met and married in Donetsk in 1982. There was one child of the marriage. In 1991, the family moved to the UK and applied for asylum which was granted on an indefinite basis in 2000. Per H, the marriage was a happy one. R2’s case was that the marriage was abusive.

In 2008, a divorce petition was purportedly issued by W (via solicitors (‘AS Solicitors’) and under a different name) on the basis of unreasonable behaviour. An application to dismiss that petition was made in November 2012 which was granted in 2013. H stated he was unaware of this petition and the subsequent dismissal application.

A further petition was issued in April 2014 on the ground of five years’ separation, stating that the parties had separated six years previously. A statement of service from a process server stated that the petition had been personally served on H. Decree Nisi was pronounced in October 2014 and Decree Absolute in November 2014. H and R2 agree that the date of marriage on that Decree Absolute is incorrect.

In 2015, W purchased a property in her sole names (H and W having lived in rental accommodation for the duration of the marriage). H’s position was that he lived with W at this property until her death in hospital, where she was always referred to as his Wife.

The King’s Proctor was invited to intervene and declined to do so. In her letter responding to the invitation she said:

‘The King’s Proctor only intervenes in matrimonial proceedings where there is credible evidence of fraud, suppression of material facts, or a procedural impropriety that would undermine the legitimacy of the decree… there is no evidence to support such an intervention.’

Discussion

H’s position was that he knew nothing of either divorce petition prior to R2 mentioning it after W had died. His case was that the documents used to obtain Decree Absolute were forged. He relied on the fact that the solicitors named on both divorce petitions (AS Solicitors) were the same solicitors R2 had instructed for his previous divorces. AS Solicitors claimed that their file in this matter no longer exists and it was H’s case that this was because the file never existed at all.

R2 denied that he was involved in H and W’s divorce proceedings and that he had been a client of AS Solicitors, although his former wife had been. His case was that H had spent a significant amount of time in Uganda where he had a girlfriend and in 2010 he went to live there permanently, abandoning W. R2 also claimed that when H returned to the UK, he continued to live in the rental property whilst W moved to the property she purchased.

H’s awareness of any divorce proceedings

The court considered the certificate of service from the process server. He stated that H was served at his rented address and that H freely admitted to him who he was. The process server was not called to give evidence.

Additionally, the court considered the 2008 petition, the application for dismissal of that petition, the following notice of hearing and the order made by District Judge Smith at that hearing. On the back of all of these documents in writing was a notation by the court which indicated that they had been court served on both parties.

The judge was satisfied that H was fully aware of both the 2008 and the 2014 petitions. HHJ Farquhar went on to comment that ‘this finding clearly goes to the credibility of [H]’ but reminded himself of the Lucas direction.

Did W knowingly initiate divorce proceedings?

The Decree Absolute incorrectly stated both W’s name and the date of marriage. H’s counsel argued that the Decree Absolute could not relate to the parties or their marriage and that there was no jurisdiction for amendment.

As considered by Sir Andrew McFarlane P in the case of X v Y (Divorce: Rectification of Decrees) [2020] EWHC 1116, a court has discretion to correct an error as to date of marriage and the decree is not rendered void by the error. The jurisdiction to make this rectification is found in FPR 4.1(6).

The issue for the court was whether the rule could provide jurisdiction to amend a decree absolute to change the name of or substitute a party.

The judge dismissed H’s conspiracy theory in relation to R2’s involvement with H and W’s divorce on the basis there was no evidence or logical basis to support it. He was satisfied that the people referred to within the Decree Absolute were H and W.

The judge amended the Decree Absolute to correctly reflect both the names of the parties and the date of marriage under FPR 4.1(6).

Were H and W separated for five years, or at all?

In light of the judge’s finding as to H’s credibility from the other issues in the case, the judge considered the dispute as to whether the marriage had been a happy one (as put forward by H) or whether there were issues concerning domestic abuse (as suggested by R2).

The 2008 petition stated: ‘he respondent has been mentally and physically violent towards the petitioner’. R2’s evidence was that his mother had confided in him that she had experienced domestic abuse and physical and sexual assault by H during the marriage.

The judge found that H’s evidence was ‘simply not correct’. H adduced witness statements from several family friends, all of which contained very similar phrases and were ultimately found to be unhelpful to the court. There was also a witness statement from H and W’s son which stated that he considered his parents were in a loving marriage for 4 decades. He supported H’s conspiracy theory. In evidence, he stated that he had asked his mother in 2010–2012 whether she was looking for a divorce which the judge found surprising in the context of a purportedly happy marriage. The son’s evidence was also not accepted.

Whether the parties had been separated for five years was more uncertain. The court concluded that it was not necessary to determine this factual point. Given that the judge had found that H had been served with the divorce petition in 2014, he could not legitimately bring the argument to court 10 years later.

Held

The judge held that there was no procedural irregularity in this case. The 2014 petition was correctly filed and was served on H, who failed to respond. H’s only credible allegation was that the parties had not been separated for five years but that was not credible enough to permit the court to make an order to set aside the Decree Absolute.

H’s application was dismissed with the issue of costs adjourned to written submissions in the absence of agreement.