GHJ v FDS [2026] EWFC 54 (B)

Judgment date: 24 February 2026

https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2026/53.html

HHJ Farquhar. An illogical conspiracy theory: court refuses to set aside a decree absolute granted over 10 years ago.

Background

This was a final hearing of H’s application to set aside a decree absolute granted on 21 November 2014.

H and W married in the USSR in 1982 and had one child together (now aged 43). W died in March 2022, so the application was brought against her and her son from a previous relationship (R2).

W first petitioned for divorce in 2008 on the basis of unreasonable behaviour, but that petition was dismissed in 2013. She issued a further petition in April 2014 based on five years’ separation. A process server confirmed personal service on H in June 2014, and the decree absolute was pronounced in November 2014.

In 2015, W purchased a shared ownership property in her sole name using her own funds. The dispute appeared to be driven largely by inheritance issues arising after W’s death.

H claimed he only became aware of the divorce after W died. In June 2023, he applied to set aside the decree absolute, alleging that:

• he had never been served with the divorce documents;
• the decree recorded the wrong marriage date;
• the parties had never separated;
• W’s name was incorrectly stated;
• documents used to obtain the decree were forged; and
• W was not involved in obtaining the divorce.

In 2024, H added allegations that:

• the marriage certificate translation was incorrect; and
• W’s solicitors had colluded with R2 in obtaining the divorce.

The law

• In X v Y (Divorce: Rectification of Decrees) [2020] EWHC 1116 it was held that where a decree of divorce has been granted by a competent court in accordance with the law but the decree gives the wrong date of the effective marriage, the decree is not rendered void by that error and the court has a discretion to correct that error so that the record shall refer to the correct date of the marriage.
• FPR 4.1(6) enables the court to vary such an order: ‘A power of the court under these rules to make an order includes a power to vary or revoke the order.’
• In Shahzad v Mazher [2021] 2 FLR 707 at [14] the Court of Appeal stated that if a respondent does ‘not respond to the petition as required under the FPR 2010, they are likely to find they are unable later to contest the proceedings and the court will make a decree of divorce’, and at [51] the Court of Appeal said: ‘a decree absolute effects an important change of status. It is equivalent to a judgement “in rem” and as a result, is an order which does not simply affect the personal rights of the parties to the decree but is an order which is conclusive as to a person’s status and is, what is sometimes termed, “good against the world”. Accordingly, everyone is entitled to rely on it as establishing that the parties are no longer married.’

Held

(1) Knowledge of the petition

The court found clear evidence that H knew about both the 2008 and 2014 petitions. It concluded he had been dishonest about his lack of knowledge, which significantly damaged his credibility.

The allegation that R2 had orchestrated the divorce proceedings was rejected outright. The court held there was ‘simply no evidence whatsoever’ to support H’s conspiracy theory, describing it as both unsupported and ‘totally illogical’.

(2) Errors in the petition

Although the petition contained errors, the evidence clearly showed that W intended to divorce H and that H knew the proceedings related to their marriage. The errors did not invalidate the decree, and the court amended the record accordingly.

(3) Basis of the petition – five years’ separation

The court had deep concerns about H’s credibility and that of the witnesses which he had called, which included the parties’ son. The court noted that he appeared to have ‘completely bought into his father’s conspiracy theory even though there is simply no evidence to support it’; [54].

While W’s evidence was unavailable, there was evidence that she did not regard the marriage as a happy one, including reports of domestic abuse made to R2.

In any event, the court held that it would be ‘totally inappropriate’ for it to reconsider the factual basis of the petition now. If H wished to challenge the basis of the petition, he should have done so at the time. He did not. The court found no procedural irregularity justifying re-opening the matter.

For those reasons, H’s application was dismissed.

Costs

A costs order was made in favour of the respondents in the sum of £33,750.