P v M (Appeal: Unfair Hearing: Variation of Periodical Payments: Global Orders) [2026] EWHC 1330 (Fam)

Judgment date: 3 June 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/fam/2026/1330

Harrison J allows an appeal against a final order made by HHJ Wright, which varied a previous order made by DDJ Butler, which reduced periodical payments paid to W due to a change in H’s income.

Background

The parties involve a French national H (aged 47) and a UK National W (aged 43). They met in 2013, married in 2016 and separated in 2018 after a relationship of approximately 5 years including cohabitation. They divorced in 2019. They have one child, C (aged 9), who lives with W under a Child Arrangements Order, made in 2025. The H also has a daughter, S (aged 17), from a previous relationship, living with her mother in Paris.

Both parties work in the film and TV industry on a freelance basis. Following separation, the W and C moved to London and H returned to Paris.

Order made by DDJ Butler

Following a Final Hearing in May 2019, DDJ Butler made the following order and awarded W the following:

1. Two lump sums of £8,000.
2. Periodical payments to W on a decreasing basis:
   a. £4,000 per month from 1 October 2018 until December 2021;
   b. £3,000 per month until December 2027;
   c. £2,000 per month until December 2034;
   d. A nominal order until completion of C’s tertiary education, limited to his first degree (including a gap year).
3. Upon the expiry of the term for periodical payments there was to be a clean break, but there was no bar against the W applying to extend the term.
4. Periodical payments of £1,500 per month for C.
5. The figures for periodical payments were all to be inflated annually by reference to the retail price index.
6. H gave an undertaking to meet the cost of life insurance.

The variation application

H applied to vary the order on 20 December 2023. The matter proceeded slowly and came before HHJ Wright for a three-day Final Hearing in November 2025. Her decision varied the periodical payments downwards to £2,500 per month for the period of 1 December 2025 and 31 December 2027. The RPI indexation clause was discharged.

This was due to findings that H’s net income was substantially lower than DDJ Butler had anticipated, and instead approximately £11,500 per month. H also had significant new financial commitments including private school fees for C, increased maintenance for S and HMRC tax arrears. HHJ Wright also found that the W’s budget was ‘unrealistic and inappropriate’, and that she had debts of £85,000 described as ‘soft not commercial’. Further, she declined to backdate the variation.

Financial impact

Over the lifetime of the order, the variation would result in W receiving approximately £134,538 less than DDJ Butler had estimated she would need. Additionally, W was receiving only £9,479.40 per year in child maintenance, compared to approximately £24,000 per year under the original order. This left her approximately £2,750 per month worse off in total.

The grounds of appeal

The W appealed HHJ Wright’s order on five grounds, summarised as follows:

1. The court’s decision contained serious procedural irregularities. This was due to the fact that W was not permitted to give oral evidence, adverse findings had been made without cross-examination, there were many judicial interruptions during cross-examination, and the courts expressed the view that the original order was wrong and that the decision was ‘all but made’ before closing submissions.
2. There was an error in evaluating H’s income and accepting his evidence despite it being inconsistent, by applying a notional tax liability to H’s foreign income despite H accepting that relevant figure was net of tax.
3. The courts determined the parties shared the same needs despite W being the primary carer of C.
4. A failure to consider C’s welfare.
5. The courts were wrong to conclude they had no jurisdiction to vary upwards and / or make a Global Maintenance Order.

Outcome of the Appeal

The appeal was allowed on Grounds 1, 2 and 5, but Harrison J noted his decision came with a ‘significant degree of regret’.

Ground 1

Harrison J made critical findings against W’s budget without the W having been cross-examined on any of it. Applying the rule in Browne v Dunn and the Supreme Court's restatement of that rule in Griffiths v Tui UK Ltd, a party must challenge evidence in cross-examination before inviting the court to reject it. The W was never given the opportunity to respond in evidence to the challenges being made against her budget.

The transcript revealed a pattern of excessive intervention by the judge, including 45 interruptions during counsel's submissions, saying ‘it does not matter’ or ‘it really does not matter’ on 16 occasions when counsel was pursuing a line of cross-examination or argument, and the judge herself used an online UK tax calculator to arrive at a net income figure of approximately £120,000 for H, which she put to him directly. H then used this despite it being inconsistent with his own accountant's letter and featuring nowhere in his written evidence.

Due to the nature and extent of the interruptions, this prevented H’s income from being adequately addressed, rendering the hearing unfair.

Ground 2

This ground succeeded for the same reasons identified under Ground 1. The approach to the H’s income was flawed due to a wrong tax assumption, ignoring French tax credits, ignoring the fact that the majority of H’s income was drawn from his companies as dividends, subject to a different tax regime and a pattern of his income was not established despite this fluctuating from year to year.

As a result, the net income figure of £11,500 per month arrived on unreliable foundations.

Ground 5

This ground succeeded in full. W had sought to increase the spousal element of maintenance and convert it into a Global Maintenance Order to address the shortfall caused by the CMS assessing child maintenance at a far lower figure (£9,479.40 per year) than the original order had provided (approximately £24,000 per year). HHJ Wright had declined jurisdiction on the basis that the CMS assessment was under appeal.

Harrison J held that this was wrong. The court undoubtedly had jurisdiction to increase the spousal periodical payments. The original apportionment between spousal and child maintenance had not been the subject of detailed analysis by DDJ Butler – he had simply adopted the H’s proposed figure of £1,500 per month for child maintenance. At the time of the original order the CMS had no jurisdiction as the husband was resident overseas; that position had since changed. The W was therefore entitled to argue that the spousal element should be increased to reflect the shortfall in child maintenance now being assessed by the CMS.

The appeal was allowed on this ground so that the wife would have the opportunity to pursue these arguments at the rehearing.

Directions for rehearing

The matter has now been remitted to the Central Family Court for a two-day rehearing before a circuit judge.

H must disclose:

• company accounts for the last three years;
• non-corporate personal accounts and worldwide tax returns;
• clear itemised explanation of business expenses (corporate and otherwise);
• personal bank and credit card statements for the past 12 months;
• communications with HMRC showing how the tax liability arose and the repayment agreement;
• updated budget.

W must disclose:

• evidence of income over the last three years;
• bank and credit card statements for the past 12 months;
• updated budget.

Either party challenging the other's budget must provide a schedule identifying challenged items, a brief narrative, and an alternative figure. If H contends the W should move to cheaper accommodation, he must provide property particulars. W should in principle be permitted to give oral evidence in response to significant budget challenges, subject to the trial judge's discretion.

Harrison J urged both parties to attempt to settle, noting that costs were already disproportionate and that pursuing the matter to trial carried significant risk for both.