Stop! In the Name of the LSA: Why Your Favourite Legal Exec Can’t Touch That Form A after Mazur and XX v GH

A precursor that changed everything: the judgment in Mazur

The decision in Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) set off a controlled detonation under long standing assumptions about the role of non authorised fee earners in litigation. What began as a dispute about a non authorised employee’s involvement in a debt claim mushroomed into a deep statutory analysis of the Legal Services Act 2007 (‘LSA’) and the delicate question of who precisely is entitled to conduct litigation.

The High Court concluded that an employee of an authorised entity is not entitled to conduct litigation merely because they are supervised. The LSA, the court held, makes an uncompromising distinction between authorised persons and exempt persons, and supervision bridges no regulatory gap. The court also rejected reliance on correspondence from the SRA suggesting the contrary (though disavowed at the hearing). As a result, the High Court overturned a substantial costs order and replaced it with no order, making clear that the first instance judge had misunderstood the statutory position.

This clarity was always going to reverberate beyond costs and commercial litigation. It soon did – directly into the family courts.

A sector feels the shockwaves: the application in XX v GH

In XX v GH [2026] EWFC 51 (B) HHJ Farquhar in the Family Court sitting at Brighton was confronted with the practical consequences of Mazur for family law cases. The issue arose when Family Law Partners, a highly respected specialist family law firm, sought an exemption permitting their senior Chartered Legal Executive, Ms Lisa Burton Durham, to conduct litigation despite not being individually authorised.

Before Mazur, Ms Burton Durham had been undertaking litigation steps as thousands of legal executives nationwide routinely did: drafting Forms A, C100s and other application forms in family proceedings, filing documents, liaising with the court, instructing counsel, and running litigation strategy under the supervision of authorised solicitors. After Mazur, that approach was no longer lawful. The firm therefore applied for the court to grant an exemption under Schedule 3 LSA so that she could continue running the client’s financial remedy and children proceedings. The application went further and sought exemptions for her other ongoing cases and, in effect, a forward looking exemption for any future proceedings.

The respondent opposed the exemption, citing alleged concerns about a letter previously written in the case, though these objections played little part in the legal analysis.

Judicial caution meets regulatory structure

With minimal statutory guidance on how an exemption should be granted, the judge turned to parallel case law concerning exemptions for rights of audience. Those authorities emphasise that Parliament’s regulatory scheme must not be undermined by over liberal use of exemptions, that such powers exist for exceptional circumstances only, and that courts must be slow to create informal categories of quasi authorised practitioners.

The judge accepted that Ms Burton Durham was highly experienced, well respected, and extremely likely to succeed in obtaining formal authorisation under the new CILEx Regulation routes now available. He also accepted that refusing exemption would cause delay and additional costs, and would disrupt the applicant’s choice of representative. But these difficulties, he held, were not exceptional; indeed, they were common to all cases involving non authorised Chartered Legal Executives post Mazur.

The court therefore refused the application. It took the view that granting an exemption in such circumstances would subvert Parliament’s regulatory structure, particularly now that dedicated pathways for authorisation exist. It also dismissed the request for exemptions in other cases, pointing out that Schedule 3 LSA only permits case specific exemptions and does not allow for a generalised licence to litigate.

Despite refusing the application, the court granted permission to appeal, recognising that the issue has widespread significance and may require higher court guidance, especially as the Mazur appeal was imminent. The Court of Appeal heard the appeal in Mazur at the end of February 2026 with judgment reserved. HHJ Farquahar granted permission to appeal in XX v GH given there was very obviously ‘some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard’ per FPR 30.3(7).

Practical realities for family law practitioners

The impact of these two cases is already reshaping everyday practice. Firms must now ensure that any individual undertaking litigation tasks such as issuing applications, signing statements of case, corresponding with the court, making case management decisions, or instructing counsel, is either an authorised person or exempt for that specific case. The assumption that supervision within an SRA regulated firm would suffice is no longer sustainable. A careful audit of roles and responsibilities is becoming essential, as is internal training to differentiate between ‘supporting’ the conduct of litigation (permissible) and ‘conducting’ litigation (reserved and regulated).

Clients may also require reassurance as firms reconfigure how Chartered Legal Executives and paralegals participate in cases. While this adjustment may be organisationally disruptive, the judgments underline that compliance with the statutory scheme is a matter not only of regulation but also of potential criminal liability. The need for clarity, structure and documented authorisation is now unavoidable.

Guidance for moving forward: what to do and what not to do

Family law solicitors navigating this new environment should begin by ensuring that only properly authorised individuals undertake litigation steps within the meaning of the LSA. Firms should review their internal workflows to confirm that legal executives or other non authorised fee earners are supporting cases rather than conducting them. Applying for authorisation through the available routes is a vital step for maintaining continuity of client representation – easier said than done and likely to be time-consuming but essential if firms want their legal executives to be running their case-loads again.

Firms should avoid relying on supervision as a legal safety net, as both Mazur and XX v GH make clear that supervision has no bearing on entitlement to conduct litigation. It is equally important to avoid seeking broad or prospective exemptions from the court, as these are beyond the court’s jurisdiction and inconsistent with Parliament’s intention. Solicitors should also take care not to assume that client preference, cost efficiency or continuity of representation will meet the threshold of ‘exceptional circumstances’, as the court has expressly rejected those considerations as insufficient.

Clear, early communication with clients about these constraints is advisable, both to manage expectations and to avoid mid proceedings disruption. Above all, solicitors should refrain from permitting non authorised staff to exercise independent judgment on litigation strategy, sign formal documents, or act as the primary handler of a litigated case without individual authorisation or a specific judicial exemption.

The outcome of Mazur on appeal is eagerly awaited.