TH v AR & Anor (No. 1: Financial Remedies: Antisuit Injunction) [2026] EWFC 220

3 August 2026. Mr Nicholas Allen KC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge. The husband obtained an interim anti-suit injunction, pending judgment in financial remedy proceedings, to prohibit the wife from pursuing foreign proceedings.

Judgment date: 3 August 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/2026/220

Mr Nicholas Allen KC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge. The husband obtained an interim anti-suit injunction, pending judgment in financial remedy proceedings, to prohibit the wife from pursuing foreign proceedings concerning Russian property interests already in issue before the English court.

Background

The husband (‘H’), aged 84, and the wife (‘W’), aged 54, are dual British and Russian citizens. H resides in the parties’ family home in Odintsovo, near Moscow, of which he is the legal and beneficial owner. W has lived in England since August 2014, though she may presently be living in Russia at her parents’ address. The parties married in Moscow, Russia on 4 August 2000, separated in December 2024/January 2025 and divorced on 20 November 2025.

The parties’ ES2 showed total net resources to be £47.5m. W had no input into this, and H did not believe that it represented all resources available to W.

During the parties’ marriage, the legal ownership of several properties was transferred from their names to those of W’s father. H asserts that the parties retained the beneficial ownership of these assets, but W stated that they belong to her father.

On 20 July 2012, the parties transferred ownership of two properties and car parking spaces in London to W’s father, who sold them on 20 June 2025 and 1 October 2025 respectively for a total of £10,589,000.

On 9 July 2024, W transferred her shareholding in CD, a Cyprus-incorporated company valued by the parties’ single joint expert (SJE) at approximately £23.6m before tax. CD owned a Russian company, B, that owned a shopping centre in Moscow. On 15 June 2026, B and its underlying Russian assets were redomiciled into Russia, stripping CD of the asset that gave its shares their value.

Peel J made a freezing order against W and her father on 9 October 2025, which the judge continued on 22 October 2025. The final hearing in the parties’ financial remedy proceedings was heard between 27 and 31 July 2026.

The application

H’s solicitors filed an application for an interim anti-suit injunction on 29 July 2026, to prevent W from engaging in any foreign proceedings in relation to the parties’ property in Russia or any other financial or proprietary claims arising out of the marriage. It was submitted that, under the Russian matrimonial property regime, W might seek to assert a claim to a 50% interest in the property at Odintsovo. The property was valued by the SJE at approximately £4,036,353.

H submitted that his concern arose because of the actions of W and her father. He regarded the sale of the London properties to be egregious given the freezing order he had first filed an application for on 5 August 2025 – though this had initially been refused by DDJ Handa on 8 August 2025. H also regarded the redomiciliation of company B as a breach of the extant freezing order by W and/or her father and of the mirror order that had been made final in Cyprus on May 2026.

The law

Per s 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, an anti-suit injunction may be granted by the High Court ‘in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so’. Per s 37(2) of the 1981 Act, such an order may be made ‘unconditionally or on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just’.

Drawing on E v E (Anti-suit Injunction: Children) [2021] EWHC 956 (Fam) per Peel J at [33]–[36], the judge summarised the principles that apply to an application for an anti-suit injunction sought in financial remedy proceedings as follows at [33]:

(a) England must be the natural forum for the resolution of the dispute, such that the English court has a sufficient interest in, or connection with, the matter in question to justify the indirect interference with the foreign court which an anti-suit injunction entails (Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v Lee Kui Jak and Another, Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel, Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP [2009] EWCA Civ 725);

(b) the English court must have personal jurisdiction over the respondent in relation to the dispute. If the English court has jurisdiction over the substance of a dispute to which the respondent is a party, then it will ordinarily have personal jurisdiction over the respondent (Masri v CCI [2008] EWCA Civ 625). Relief cannot be granted unless valid service on the respondent can be effected (Airbus v Patel);

(c) there must be an appropriate ground for obtaining relief. The conduct of the respondent in commencing or pursuing (or, in a quia timet case, threatening) the foreign proceedings must be vexatious, oppressive or otherwise unconscionable (Cadre v Astra Asigurari [2005] EWHC 2626 (Comm));

(d) the injunction must be required by the ends of justice, and must not unjustly deprive the respondent of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage in the foreign forum of which it would be unfair to deprive them (Société Nationale v Lee Kui Jak); and

(e) if all the above are satisfied, the court must then exercise its discretion as to whether to grant the injunction (Star Reefers v JFC Group [2012] EWCA Civ 14). In so doing the court will have regard to all the circumstances, which include: (i) whether the application has been brought with appropriate promptness (ADM Asia Pacific v PT Budi [2016] EWHC 1427 (Comm)); (ii) the facts upon which the application is based; (iii) the connections with each jurisdiction; (iv) the nature of the substantive proceedings both in this jurisdiction and in the foreign jurisdiction (if any) and the stage they have both reached; (v) the principles of judicial comity; (vi) the circumstances in which the foreign proceedings (if any) are brought; (vii) the balance of prejudice to each party depending upon whether the injunctive relief is or is not granted; and (viii) any other relevant matters (E v E).

Submissions

W was unrepresented and did not appear at the hearing. Mr Molyneux submitted on H’s behalf that:

(a) England is unquestionably the natural forum. W has submitted to and in her divorce order application invoked this jurisdiction. The English court is the only forum seised of the financial remedy application (and the whole thereof);

(b) the English court has personal jurisdiction over W in relation to the dispute;

(c) pursuit of a Russian claim would be vexatious and oppressive – its vice lies in what it would do to the English proceedings;

(d) no legitimate legal or juridical advantage is lost, save for the prospect of a second, inconsistent determination of an asset already before this court. That is not a legitimate advantage of which it would be unjust to deprive W: it is the very vexation complained of;

(e) the application is prompt and H comes with ‘clean hands’, having moved as soon as the threat crystallised (i.e. the alleged unconscionable conduct by W and/or her father); and

(f) comity is respected in that the injunction binds W personally; it makes no order directed to the Russian court and expresses no view as to Russian law.

Held

The judge considered it just and convenient to make the order, the ends of justice requiring it, finding that:

‘a) the parties’ financial remedy proceedings were before this court, W having not disputed that England is the appropriate forum for the determination of all financial claims arising from the marriage;
 
b) the property is situated in Russia, is legally and beneficially owned by H alone and is registered in his sole name under Russian law;
 
c) the property had been disclosed and is included in the schedule of assets before this court. Both parties treated it in their Forms E as an asset falling for consideration under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973; and
 
d) H’s fears that W will pursue a claim in Russia for a 50% interest in the property in Odintsovo are well-grounded, given W’s alleged conduct in relation to CD.
 
e) H has applied promptly upon the threat of Russian proceedings emerging.
 
f) No legitimate legal or juridical advantage was lost by restraining W from pursuing a Russian claim. A Russian half-share claim would give W two bites at the same asset: its value (or the asset itself) in the English distribution, and a proprietary half-interest abroad. The anti-suit jurisdiction protects parties from such vexatious, oppressive and unconscionable conduct.’

The order was made interim to ‘hold the ring’ and avoid pre-empting the judge’s substantive judgment on which party should retain the property in Odintsovo.

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