What’s App Doc?

Maxine Reid-Roberts & Ors v Mei-Lin & Gudmundson [2026] EWHC 49 (Ch) has made a bit of a media stir. The headlines are all about whether you can give your home away by a WhatsApp. However, the decision is more interesting and of wider application for financial remedy practitioners than these soundbites suggest.

The background is something of a cautionary tale about the hazards of delay. Ms Mei Lin (‘W’) and Mr Gudmundson (‘H’) were married and going through divorce proceedings. They had not settled at FDR and were heading to a final hearing in February 2019. In the course of December 2018, by some emails and WhatsApp messages, they explored the contours of a possible settlement both in respect of children and property. The very rough effect of this was W would get the jointly owned FMH and some child maintenance. Both parties were represented in proceedings, but these discussions were direct between the parties.

The discussions did not result in a formal settlement. The case thus went to trial in February 2019 before HHJ Meston QC. Judgment was reserved. For various reasons, including pressure of judicial work and further submissions by both parties, there was a considerable delay in judgment being handed down. Final judgment and order were only handed down in March 2020.

Towards the end of this period of delay, in November 2019, a statutory demand was made on H. This then led to a bankruptcy petition in December 2019 and a bankruptcy order being made against H in February 2020. Neither W nor the court were told of these developments prior to March 2020. H only informed them at the hand down hearing.

The effect of the bankruptcy order was that H’s share of the FMH vested automatically in his trustee in bankruptcy. This deprived the judge in March 2020 of the power to make the property adjustment order he was otherwise minded to make (HHJ Meston QC nonetheless did make such an order though it was inevitably overturned on appeal – Gudmundsson v Lin [2024] EWHC 1576 (Fam)).

W then tried and failed to annul the bankruptcy proceedings on the basis the debt was contrived and/or intended to frustrate the FR proceedings. She then sought to resist the subsequent application for the sale of the FMH by the trustee in bankruptcy on essentially two bases:

1. Relying on Hudson v Hathway [2022] EWCA Civ 1648 that the effect of the emails and WhatsApps in December 2018 had been sufficient for H to have divested himself of his 50% beneficial interest in the FMH, pursuant to s 53(1)(a) and (c) of the Law of Property Act 1925, and thus he had no beneficial interest to pass to the trustee in February 2020 which could now be realised by sale; and, if this argument should not succeed, in the alternative
2. That the circumstances of this case amounted to ‘exceptional circumstances’ within the meaning of s 335A of the Insolvency Act 1986 such that the court should not make an order an order for the immediate sale of the FMH within the bankruptcy proceedings.

At first instance the judge:

• accepted that the emails and WhatsApps together did evince an intention by H to divest himself of his beneficial interest in the FMH;
• found that the identification of H in the header of the WhatsApp was sufficient to be signed writing applying Hudson v Hathway and the authorities referred to therein;
• however, because the parties were in the midst of divorce proceedings, applying Xydhias v Xhydias [1999] 1 All ER 386, concluded there could be no binding agreement between them by which H could divest himself of his beneficial interest; and
• concluded that the circumstances in which the bankruptcy petition had been brought combined with mental health issues of W and her son meant that there were ‘exceptional circumstances’ within the meaning of s 335A(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 so as justifying delaying sale of the FMH until 31 July 2032 (A delay of in excess of 8 years).

W appealed the Xydhias decision and the trustee in bankruptcy cross appealed the other findings. On appeal Cawson J:

• allowed the Xydhias appeal – Xydhias, as explained in Soulsbury v Soulsbury [2008] Fam 1, was narrowly limited to an agreement to settle the matrimonial proceedings themselves (which required the imprimatur of the court and was thus not legally effective until such time) – it did not prevent married parties entering transactions that were not strictly dependent on the outcome of the matrimonial proceedings – thus H here could have immediately disposed of his interest in the FMH in December 2018 despite the ongoing financial remedy proceedings;
• however, on the cross appeal, disagreed with the judge that the effect of the communications showed an intention by H to divest himself of his share of the FMH ‘immediately and unequivocally’. Cawson J contrasted the position in Hudson v Hathway. There Lewison LJ had found that Mr Hudson had indicated a clear intention to divest himself of his interest immediately rather than in the future as part of a concluded deal. In the present case the communications, taken as a whole, were part of an informal attempt to settle proceedings and H giving up his share was part of that prospective settlement. Neither party believed such settlement had been reached and neither party appeared to have brought the communications to the attention of their matrimonial lawyers. This all suggested the discussions were inconclusive and not concluded;
• went on to find, in any event, that a party’s name appearing in a WhatsApp feed was not the equivalent of a signature for the purposes of s 53(1) of the LPA 1925 – for such was no more than an identification of the sender, incidental to the message. It was thus equivalent to an email address appearing with an email. To be a signature there needed to be something more, usually in the body of the message, showing the advertent approval or acknowledgement of the specific contents of the communication – such as the addition of the name at the bottom of the email as in Hudson v Hathway. There was nothing like that in the WhatsApp messages in this case;
• whilst disagreeing with the entirety of the judge’s reasoning, was prepared to accept that there were exceptional circumstances – on the basis the bankruptcy occurred very late in the divorce proceedings and thus the availability of H’s share of the FMH amounted to something of a windfall for the creditors. Further that there was some evidence of mental health issues in respect of W and her son. However, Cawson J significantly reduced the sale deferment, bringing it forward from 31 July 2032 to 31 July 2027 on the basis the original deferment did not properly take into account the interests of the creditors.

What then are the important takeaways from Reid-Roberts v Mei Lin & Gudmunson for the financial remedies/TLATA lawyer? I would suggest the following:

1. Despite some of the press coverage it is not the case that a declaration of trust or disposal of interest under s 53(1) of the LPA 1925 can never occur by WhatsApp – simply that there must be some form of acknowledgement within the message that its contents are approved – the addition of a name at the end of the body of the message is likely to suffice. This includes an automatic signature. However, just as with emails, the mere fact the sender is automatically identified in the message header is not sufficient.
2. However, perhaps more importantly, such messages must be seen in context rather than taken in isolation. To echo Baroness Hale’s famous aphorism from Stack v Dowden [2007], ‘in law context is everything’. Part of Cawson J’s reasoning was that the very informality of WhatsApp made it less likely, objectively, that H was intending to there and then dispose of his beneficial interest in the FMH. Since Hudson v Hathway there has been a considerable growth in cases where throwaway lines in voluminous electronic communications have been latched on to as apparent surrenders of beneficial interest or evidence of declarations of trust. The court will examine these communications carefully and the more informal the medium and indeed the communications themselves, the slower the court will be to find clear intentions to release or vary valuable property rights. Particularly if the parties at the time do not seem to ascribe that meaning to them.
3. Though not expressly discussed in Reid-Roberts v Mei Lin & Gudmunson, it is suggested care also needs to be taken with communications sent in the immediate aftermath of a relationship breakdown. A recent example is Dervis v Denis [2025] EWHC 902(Ch). There, in a case otherwise decided by an express declaration of trust in a TR1, an appeal was attempted based on emails sent just post separation where it was said one of the parties was giving up his claims on a jointly owned property. The appeal was rejected by Edwin Johnson J, principally as the point had not been properly taken below. However, it was noted that the objective meaning of such emails was much more ambiguous than in Hudson v Hathway given the stage of the break-up and emotive nature of the communications*.* Their meaning would thus have needed proper examination against the full matrix of fact which could only be found at trial. Although Edwin Johnson J expressly did not decide the point, reading between the judicial lines, it appears he would have been slow to find the emails constituted an express release of beneficial interest.
4. Of course, none of this should take away from the fact that declarations of trust and/or surrenders of beneficial interest can be found in signed emails and possibly signed WhatsApps, or even signed text messages. Hudson v Hathway itself is an example where a clear intention to surrender a beneficial interest was found in signed email correspondence. Yet it is of note such was evidencing a very clear agreement, concluded some time after separation, and not in the heat of ongoing litigation. Another recent example is Khan v Khan [2025] EWCA Civ 146. In that case confirmation in a signed email that a brother held a property for the benefit of his sisters sufficed to be an express declaration of trust under s 53(1)(b) of the LPA 1925. Again, however, the email was relatively unambiguous and sent at a time long before any family fall-out or contemplation of litigation.
5. Moving on from TLATA points there is a useful reminder of the limits of Xydhias. In particular that this does not prevent married couples effectively disposing of assets even whilst they await the outcome of matrimonial proceedings. Just as they can voluntarily sell or transfer the FMH pending final outcome, one of them can in principle dispose of his/her beneficial interest in signed writing. Such might even be a prudent measure if there is considered a risk of an impending insolvency situation that may take effect prior to the approval of an agreed final order. Though in the latter case the possibility of a subsequent challenge by a trustee in bankruptcy under s 339 of the Insolvency Act 1986 could not be entirely ruled out – such would depend on the facts.
6. Finally, though perhaps more of interest to bankruptcy lawyers, is the suggestion that if financial remedy proceedings are pipped at the post by bankruptcy proceedings, that of itself may be the basis for an exceptional circumstances argument by the non-bankrupt spouse in respect of deferring any order for sale sought by the trustee in bankruptcy. This is probably only applicable where the delay in the matrimonial proceedings is of itself out of the ordinary – here more than a year having elapsed between the conclusion of the trial and the judgment/order. This gave rise to the argument that there had been a windfall for the creditors. For in normal course there would have been a final financial remedies order (and presumably final decree) long before the bankruptcy petition was lodged. However, the case law for exceptional circumstances prior to this had almost exclusively focused on the medical/physical circumstances of the other occupiers of the bankrupt’s home. So, this is an interesting example of wider considerations coming into play. Moreover, the delay in sale (though reduced on appeal to just over three years overall) is relatively generous. The case law had hitherto suggested that for a delay to last more than months required wholly exceptional circumstances and one or two years was considered the high watermark. Whether a slightly more generous approach to deferred sales may now be manifest, or this case is something of an outlier, the real takeaway for financial remedy practitioners is that the result in bankruptcy will often be significantly less advantageous for the non-bankrupt spouse than what would likely have happened in any concluded financial remedy proceedings. This will inevitably impact on the advice given in respect of possible settlement, and in respect of the wisdom of prolonging proceedings, where there is a possibility of the other spouse’s bankruptcy.