XX v GH (Legal Services Act 2007 Exemption), Re [2026] EWFC 51 (B)

Judgment date: 27 February 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/b/2026/51

HHJ Farquhar. Following the decision in Mazur, the Family Court refused an application to permit a Chartered Legal Executive to conduct litigation under the Legal Services Act 2007. The court held that exemption from the statutory scheme should be granted only in exceptional circumstances and that none arose in this case.

Background

The applicant sought an order permitting Ms Lisa Burton-Durham, a Chartered Legal Executive, to conduct litigation in financial remedy proceedings as an exempt person under Sch 3 of the Legal Services Act 2007.

The application followed Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB), in which Sheldon J held that an unauthorised individual cannot conduct litigation even under the supervision of an authorised lawyer. Prior to that decision Ms Burton-Durham, like many non-authorised practitioners, had undertaken litigation tasks on the understanding that supervision by an authorised lawyer was sufficient.

Ms Burton-Durham had been a Fellow of the Institute of Legal Executives since 2006 and was an experienced financial remedies practitioner within a leading family law firm; [20]. Following Mazur, she intended to apply for authorisation to conduct litigation through the portfolio route administered by Cilex Regulation Limited, which assesses applicants’ casework experience against the required litigation competencies, but she had not yet submitted the application; [23].

The applicant therefore sought exemption permitting Ms Burton-Durham to conduct litigation in these proceedings and in other current and future cases.

Statutory framework; [7]–[11]

Section 12 of the LSA 2007 defines reserved legal activities to include the conduct of litigation. Schedule 2 defines this as encompassing the issuing, prosecution and defence of proceedings together with ancillary functions.

Under s 13 only authorised or exempt persons may undertake such activities. Schedule 3 permits exemption where a court grants the right to conduct litigation in relation to particular proceedings.

Carrying out reserved legal activities without authorisation or exemption constitutes a criminal offence under s 14.

Test for granting an exemption

Schedule 3 LSA 2007 provides no guidance on how the discretion should be exercised. The court therefore drew assistance from authorities concerning rights of audience; [27].

In Graham v Eltham Conservative Club [2013] EWHC 979, Hickinbottom J emphasised that courts must give due deference to the statutory regulatory framework established by Parliament. Powers permitting individuals outside that scheme to perform reserved legal activities should therefore be exercised only in exceptional circumstances; [29].

Application to the facts

The applicant argued that granting exemption would be consistent with the overriding objective in FPR 1.1 by avoiding delay, cost, and disruption to the client’s chosen representation. Ms Burton-Durham’s experience and regulatory oversight through CILEX and the SRA were said to provide sufficient safeguards; [31].

The court accepted that Ms Burton-Durham was an experienced practitioner and noted the absence of any adverse findings against her; [34]. It also considered it highly likely that she would obtain authorisation to conduct litigation through the CILEX portfolio route; [35].

However, the court emphasised that due deference must be given to the will of Parliament, which restricts reserved legal activities to authorised persons. Following Mazur, Ms Burton-Durham was not authorised to conduct litigation and a clear route now existed for obtaining authorisation; [36]. Granting an exemption where such a route exists would undermine the statutory framework. An exemption could therefore be justified only in exceptional circumstances; [37].

The difficulties relied upon by the applicant, including delay, additional cost, and the client’s wish to continue instructing Ms Burton-Durham, were not exceptional. Similar consequences would arise in many cases following Mazur; [38]. The application was therefore refused.

Exemptions in other proceedings

The applicant also sought exemption for Ms Burton-Durham in other existing and future cases.

The court rejected this request. The court’s power to grant exemptions applies only to the proceedings before it. It was therefore not open to the court to grant exemptions in other cases; [44].

Granting a general exemption would effectively authorise Ms Burton-Durham to conduct litigation generally, contrary to both Mazur and the will of Parliament; [45].

Permission to appeal

Permission to appeal was granted. The court accepted that the issue raised a matter of wider importance affecting legal practice nationally and that there was a compelling reason for appellate consideration, particularly pending the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mazur; [49]–[50].