Kroupeeva v Kroupeev [2026] EWFC 85

Judgment date: 25 March 2026

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/2026/85

James Ewins KC (sitting as a deputy High Court judge). Final hearing in ultra-high net worth case with allegations of non-disclosure and with complex trust and corporate structures.

The High Court found in favour of the wife in hard-fought litigation where the husband, an extremely wealthy businessman of Russian origin, sought to frustrate the wife’s claims and the proceedings at every turn. Due to substantial non-compliance and multiple findings of non-disclosure, the court made adverse inferences in respect of the matrimonial wealth and awarded the wife assets worth £100.6m out of a total inferred pot just shy of £305m.

Background and proceedings

The parties were born and grew up in Russia, where they met as teenagers and married in their early 20s. The couple moved to London 1993, had two children together (now aged 28 and 21) and continued to reside in London as a family until their marriage broke down in 2023 when the wife discovered that her husband had for a long time been maintaining a ‘second family’ in Russia, including a teenaged son.

Throughout their marriage the family had enjoyed what the judge called ‘an exceptionally high standard of living’, with their primary residence being a seven-bedroom house in St John’s Wood in addition to villas in Portugal and Turkey, multiple properties in Russia, and regular use of a private jet.

The family’s wealth was a product of Mr Kroupeev’s business dealings during the course of their marriage in the energy sector. The majority of his business interests were within a holding company named Waterford Finance & Investment Ltd (‘Waterford’), the entire share capital of which was in turn held by The Rossini Trust. Mr and Mrs Kroupeev and their children were discretionary beneficiaries of The Rossini Trust until the breakdown of their marriage, when Mrs Kroupeeva was removed.

Upon Mrs Kroupeeva discovering Mr Kroupeev’s ‘second family’, Mr Kroupeev reduced and then withdrew entirely Mrs Kroupeeva’s access to funds, ultimately leaving her in a very difficult financial position. By the time of the final hearing, by which time Mr Kroupeev had already been subject to a worldwide freezing order on Mrs Kroupeeva’s application, as well as being in breach of multiple interim orders including the payment of maintenance pending suit and Mrs Kroupeeva’s legal fees, she had just £9,000 in bank accounts but owed £9,000 to utility companies and in council tax, in addition to owing £2.1m in legal fees.

Issues

It was not disputed that all the family’s assets were matrimonial in nature, having been generated during the parties’ marriage. However, before the judge was able to make his overall determination in consideration of the s 25 factors the legal issues to be determined, and those forming the most interesting and useful aspects of the judgement for practitioners, were:

1. The extent of the parties’ assets and the extent to which the court can or should draw adverse inferences where there are significant gaps in disclosure that preclude an accurate drawing of the financial picture;
2. Whether The Rossini Trust, being the legal owner of Waterford and thereby the assets within the holding structure, was a nuptial settlement capable of variation under s 24(1)(c) MCA; and
3. Whether the court could deploy its variation powers under s 24(1)(c) MCA through the corporate holding structure to the underlying assets.

Drawing adverse inferences

Given the extent of Mr Kroupeeva’s apparent non-disclosure, it was necessary for the judge to examine the existing authorities in detail, which he did at [56], drawing on the following principles:

1. When a party leaves such a gap in disclosure that two alternative inferences could be drawn, the court would normally draw the less favourable inference (from the perspective of the non-discloser) – J v J [1955] P 215;
2. Inferences must be ‘properly drawn and reasonable’ – Baker v Baker [1995] EWCA Civ 31. This means that the court cannot draw any inference it likes – Hersman v De Verchere [2024] EWHC 905 (Fam);
3. The court is entitled to draw inferences using a combination of the available material and judicial experience of what are ‘the inherent probabilities’ of the assets likely to have been concealed – Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34;
4. To limit the scope of what could otherwise be a ‘cheater’s charter’, the court can in its discretion infer that the available resources are such that the ‘the proposed award does represent a fair outcome’ – Mahtani v Mahtani [2025] EWFC 35;
5. In summary, ‘better an order which may be unfair to the non-disclosing party than an order which is unfair to the other party’ – F V F (Divorce: Insolvency: Annulment of Bankruptcy Order) [1994] 1 FLR 359.

The judge found that Mr Kroupeev consistently evaded requests for disclosure on the basis that the assets in question were tied up in trust and corporate structures over which he had no control or to which he had no entitlement. Through a careful investigation of the available evidence and by use of his judicial experience and discretion, the judge drew inferences to determine that Mr Kroupeev held assets in his name of £60.6m and that the assets within The Rossini Trust and Waterford had a net value of an additional £244.1m.

Variation of a nuptial settlement

At [57] the judge then provided a summary of the case law in respect of variation of a nuptial settlement, in order to determine whether The Rossini Trust was a nuptial settlement and capable of variation, highlighting the following points:

1. Does the financial arrangement make some form of continuing provision for the parties? If so, it is a ‘settlement’ within the definition of s 24(1)(c);
2. Was the settlement made upon either party in their character as either a husband or wife respectively? If so, then it is ‘nuptial’ within the definition of the act;
3. A settlement does not automatically become nuptial merely because if makes some form of continuing provision for the parties or their children;
4. The court’s power to vary a settlement only extends to the property within the part of a settlement that is found to be nuptial;
5. The court’s powers to vary are unfettered but should be deployed no further than is necessary to do justice, with ‘doing justice’ meaning: (a) consideration of the s 25 factors; (b) being fair to both parties to the marriage; (c) interfering only to the extent that is necessary; and (d) being slow to deprive innocent third parties of their rights (usually the wider class of beneficiaries of the trust).

Applying the above principles, the judge found on the facts that the Rossini Trust was a nuptial settlement capable of variation, having been settled during the course of the marriage with Mrs Kroupeeva as a beneficiary, and clearly making continuing provision for the parties. As the Rossini Trust held the entire share capital of Waterford, which was itself a holding vehicle for Mr Krouppev’s business assets, it was determined that the entirety of the assets within the trust were within the ‘nuptial’ settlement and could therefore all be subject to variation by the court.

Extending variation powers through a corporate structure

In this case, it was the resources generated by assets held within the corporate structure of Waterford, which was itself held within the Rossini Trust, that made continuing provision for the parties. There was therefore an exposition at [58] of the first instance case authorities on whether the court can extend through the corporate structure to the underlying assets to vary under s 24(1)(c), with the following examples cited:

1. In E v E (Financial Provision) [1990] 2 FLR 233, the underlying asset (the matrimonial home) made continuing provision that determined the nuptiality of the trust, and so the holding structure of the asset was consequently capable of variation; and
2. In D v D and I Trust [2009] EWHC 3062, the nuptiality of the settlement (and therefore its ability to be varied) was again derived solely from the continuing provision made by the underlying asset, which was a farm that provided a house and income. The court would therefore look through the immediate corporate structure as necessary to vary the arrangement.

Summarising these and additional first instance authorities, the judge determined that:

‘an arrangement can be characterised as nuptial and … variable pursuant to s 24(1)(c) by virtue of the ongoing provision made by its underlying assets’, and ‘where an asset is making such continuing provision, the arrangement by which it does so, which may include an intermediate corporate entity or entities, constitutes a nuptial settlement comprising the nuptial property, all of which is variable under s 24(1)(c).’

Ultimately, the judge determined that the corporate structure in this case, where the underlying assets making the continuing provision were held by Waterford, was no barrier to the court deploying its variation powers through that structure to the underlying assets.

Meeting Mrs Kroupeeva’s claim

Having considered the above principles and having made detailed findings in respect of the likely extent of the financial resources available to the family, the nuptial nature of the Rossini Trust, and being comfortable that the court’s power to vary can extend through Waterford to the underlying assets, the judge made a total award to Mrs Kroupeeva of £100.6m, comprising the following from Mr Kroupeev directly:

1. The matrimonial home in St John’s Wood (£14.4m);
2. The Portuguese villa (£10.5m); and
3. Properties in Russia worth £15.6m.

An additional lump sum of £60m was ordered in lieu of direct transfers to Mrs Kroupeeva of shares within the Rossini/Waterford structure. The court did not therefore order a variation of the trust even though it found it was within its power to do so but left it open to Mrs Kroupeeva to restore that application if necessary to enforce aspects of the award if Mr Kroupeev did not comply.

The total award amounted to 33.3% of the resources that it was determined Mr Kroupeev had access to, with the departure from equality justified by Mr Kroupeev retaining the more illiquid assets and the fact their children remain beneficiaries of the trust. The judge was satisfied that this award met Mrs Kroupeeva’s ongoing capital and income needs.