Book Review: The Road to Equal Partnership

Professor Sharon Thompson’s new book could not have landed at a better moment. The Road to Equal Partnership (Bristol University Press) sets out an agenda for the reform of Financial Remedies law, in light of the Law Commission’s scoping paper.

As we are now in the consultation period for the Government’s ‘Fairer End to Relationships’ (‘FER’) I commend this as your early summer read, preferably before you reply to the consultation.

Professor Thompson sets out the unarguable case for reform, charting the history of s 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 via White in 2000 and beyond.

It is well known that the Act does not have a statutory objective, and it is suggested that a principle of ‘equal partnership’ would assist in guiding discretion. As Professor Elizabeth Cooke, a previous Law Commissioner, highlighted,[[1]] s 25 is like giving a bus driver the instructions on how to drive a bus but not where it should be driven to. A destination of ‘equal partnership’ feels like a sensible destination given the purported aim post White to avoid gender discrimination.

[[1]]: Echoing a point articulated by Professor Patrick Parkinson, drawing on the extra-judicial writing of Justice Chisholm on the equivalent Australian statute, in ‘The Diminishing Significance of Initial Contributions to Property’ (1999) 13 Australian Journal of Family Law 52.

Professor Thompson argues that the road to an equal start to independent living has been blighted by the lower courts’ misunderstanding of and/or refusal to apply the compensation principle as was intended by the House of Lords in Miller/McFarlane.

Equal division of capital where one party retains a potent earning capacity and the other, through care giving and family related choices made during the marriage, has a much reduced or no earning capacity, is said by Professor Thompson to be self-evidently not an equal outcome.

Professor Thompson’s analysis is buttressed by a major new analysis of the compensation principle by Dr Lucy Crompton ‘We need to talk about Miller; McFarlane: why we’ve got compensation all wrong.’ [2026] CFLQ 101 and summarised in the Financial Remedies Journal as ‘Maybe Compensation Isn’t What You Think’ [2026] 2 FRJ 118.

The FER notes that, ‘In practice, the compensation principle is rarely applied by the court.’ It goes on to note:

‘The government does not consider that “compensation” as a core principle, separate from needs and sharing, is appropriate for codification. It is, therefore, not included in the overarching objective. This is because we agree with the Law Commission’s conclusion that the principle lacks a clear and settled definition in case law. We consider that codification of compensation as a core principle would introduce significant uncertainty, encourage divergent judicial approaches and materially increase the risk of litigation.’

When placing Thompson and Crompton’s thesis alongside the FER’s approach to compensation, one cannot be left but anxiously wondering whether a once in a generation opportunity is about to be missed to articulate and embed what compensation is for and why it matters on the equal road to fairness.

In the absence of a well-articulated ultimate statutory objective in financial remedies law, the present risk is that the statutory ambition of the clean break principle (which must, of course, be rigorously applied) will be allowed to dominate the space where a balance might otherwise be struck between the undoubted importance of a clean break and the importance of a globally fair outcome.

The FER goes on, however, to suggest that compensation be added as a factor in an amended s 25. ‘This would require the court to take account of any economic disadvantage suffered by a party during the marriage when assessing needs and sharing.’ With respect, if it is to be included as a s 25 factor in any event, is now the moment to grasp the nettle and treat it as a core principle, as Miller/McFarlane clearly intended? How will this ‘downgraded version’ be any more uncertain than having it as a core principle?

Professor Thompson is a leading voice in the arena of nuptial agreements. Her views are well known and repeated in her book. Whilst parties should be free to exercise their autonomy in organising their affairs, this should not be a trojan for allowing the economically stronger party to take undue advantage of the economically weaker party.

See ‘Adjudicating Undue Pressure in Nuptial Agreements’ [2025] 3 FRJ 252 and ‘A Fairer End? Gaps in the Government’s Nuptial Agreement Proposals’ (Financial Remedies Journal blog, 16 June 2025).

Most memorably in the book Professor Thompson calls for the same level of foresight and advance planning to be applied to the execution of a nuptial agreement as to the purchase of the wedding dress. The former is arguably more important than the latter.

This is a crucially important book which is making a significant contribution to the debate of the moment and deserves to be read widely.

Readers of Financial Remedies Journal can enter code CNF26 at checkout for 50% discount on The Road to Equal Partnership https://bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/the-road-to-equal-partnership.